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A SECULAR THEORY OF NATURAL  LAW
Lloyd L. Weinreb*
I appreciate  the invitation of the Fordham Natural Law Colloquium
to  make  this  presentation.  My  topic  is  certainly  within  the
Colloquium's jurisdiction,  which  is to say, it  concerns natural  law.1  I
shall  ask you to put  aside another version  of natural  law,  with which
you are likely much more familiar:  the version expressed  by Thomas
Aquinas in the thirteenth century, which, since the fourteenth century,
has been an integral part of the doctrine of the Catholic Church.  It is
not part of my purpose  to question that doctrine or to argue that it is
not  properly  called  natural  law.  It  is  also  true,  however,  that
Thomistic  philosophy  did  not  arise  in  the  thirteenth  century  out  of
thin air.  If it was a  new  beginning, nevertheless  it emerged  out of a
long  tradition  that  had  developed  over  more  than  1,500  years  and
continued  to develop  after the fourteenth century in other directions.
If  Thomism  represents  the  high  point  and  greatest  flourishing  of
natural  law, that larger tradition has also to be considered.
I set the church doctrine of natural law aside because  it is integrally,
inextricably  bound  up  with the  Catholic  faith.  Natural  law  did  not
lead  Thomas  to  that  faith,  which  was  unquestioned.  His  view  of
natural law proceeded  from  that faith and  depended  on it.  It would
be  presumptuous  of me,  not  sharing  that  faith, to speak  about  it  to
you.  My topic is not religious but intellectual.  That is not to suggest
that natural  law as a matter  of faith is not also a matter of reason.  It
was,  after  all,  Thomas's  great  achievement  to  show  that  faith  and
reason  need  not be altogether  separate.  But my  topic is  intellectual
only, intellect unaided by faith.
The  questions  I  want  to  address  are  first:  Is  there  any  theory  of
*  Dane  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  Law  School;  Visiting  Professor,  Fordham
University School of Law, Fall 2003.
1.  This  Lecture  was  originally  prepared  as  a  talk  for  the  Natural  Law
Colloquium,  sponsored  by  the  Law  School  and  Department  of  Philosophy  of
Fordham University.  The talk was presented  at the Law School on December  1, 2003.
The  material  for  the  talk  was  drawn  from  two  books:  Lloyd  L.  Weinreb,
Natural Law and Justice  (1987)  [hereinafter Weinreb, NL&J],  and Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Oedipus  at  Fenway  Park:  What  Rights  Are  and  Why  There  Are  Any  (1994)
[hereinafter Weinreb, OAFP].  This Lecture is a largely  unaltered transcription of the
talk.  References to the books on which it is based have been added.
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natural  law,  any viewpoint  or  world  view  unaided  by  faith,  that  is
properly  called natural  law?  And second:  If there  is,  is it worth our
attention?  My answer to both questions is yes.
The  questions  are  hardly ever asked.  A secular  theory  of natural
law  had  a  brief  efflorescence  after  World  War  II,  as  a  school  of
jurisprudence  associated,  in  the  United  States,  mainly  with  Lon
Fuller.2  It  is  not irrelevant  that the  wellspring  of that jurisprudence
was  an  agonized  reaction  to the  phenomenon  of Nazi  law.  As  the
agony has  faded,  so  also  has  the jurisprudence  that  sprang  from  it.
Ronald  Dworkin  has  sometimes  flirted  with  the  notion  of  a  secular
natural  law  in  his theory  of a  "right  answer"  or  "law  as  integrity."3
But it is only a flirtation, an effort to have all the girls at the dance on
one's  dance  card.  And  even  at  that,  Dworkin's  is  a  theory  of
jurisprudence,  which  is  not  my  main  concern.  Full-blown  secular
natural  law has had little staying power  and for the present has little
influence.  My  intention  is  to  return  to  the  original  natural  law
tradition, the tradition out of which the doctrines of Thomas emerged,
and  to ask whether,  those doctrines  apart,  anything  can  be found  in
the tradition that speaks to our present circumstances.
A distinct philosophy of natural law emerged  clearly in fifth century
Athens.  The  opposing  views  pervaded  Greek  thought,  not  only
philosophy  but  also  history  and literature,  the great  tragedies  above
all.  It is expressed most forcefully in the tragedies of Sophocles, as his
response  to a profound  debate about  the significance,  or meaning, of
human  existence--or  rather,  whether  human  existence  has  any
significance or meaning beyond the events themselves.  Is it finally the
case,  as Jocasta says to Oedipus, that "chance  is all in all,"4 or is there
some  larger  stage  on  which  human  lives  are  played  out?  In
philosophical  terms, the  debate  was  between  those,  like  Plato,  who
believed  that there is a natural  order and those,  notably the  Sophists,
who believed that order, however deeply rooted, is imposed by human
contrivance.  The idea of natural  order (physis) beyond  the contrived
human order (nomos) meant  more than bare causal order.  The word
for  that was  not physis but  tyche, blind  chance  or  necessity, without
meaning.  The  order  at  stake,  natural  or  human,  was  a  normative
order.  I  single  out  Sophocles  among  the  three  great  tragedians
because  he  stands  between  Aeschylus,  whose  view  of  the  cosmos
seems more  religious  than philosophical  (although  the Greeks  would
not  have  made  the  separation as we  do)  and Euripides,  who repeats
the  formulas  of  divinely  ordained  natural  order  without  much
conviction,  as,  at  best,  part  of  the  question.  For  Sophocles,  the
affirmation  of moral  order  was  a  resolution,  not  a  challenge  or  a
2.  Weinreb, NL&J, supra  note 1, at 101-08.
3.  Id. at 117-22.
4.  Sophocles, Oedipus the  King 9,  52 (David Grene trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2d
ed.  1991)  (n.p., n.d.) (line 977).
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complaint.  It  meant  that  Oedipus's  suffering,  or  Creon's  or
Philoctetes's,  all  different  in  their circumstances,  was  not merely  the
play of blind forces.  However bitter, it was, when all was revealed,  as
it ought to be and, therefore, had to be.5
There  is a  direct line from these ruminations, by way of the Greek
and  Roman  Stoics  and later  the Roman  lawyers  and  Church  fathers
and  Christian theologians,  to Thomas  Aquinas.6  Cicero, not  himself
an original thinker, provided  the phrase "natural  law."7  Brought into
contact  with  Christian  belief  in  a  personal,  all-embracing  God,  the
normative  natural order of the Greeks became  Divine Providence,  in
which human beings, able in some measure to provide for themselves,
have  a share.  Thomas Aquinas,  of course,  brought that to fruition in
his doctrine of natural law:
[T]he rational  creature  is subject  to Divine  providence  in the  most
excellent  way,  in  so far  as it partakes  of a  share  of providence,  by
being provident  both  for  itself and  for others.  Wherefore  it has  a
share  of the Eternal Reason, whereby  it has a natural inclination  to
its  proper  act and  end:  and this  participation  of the eternal law in
the rational creature is called the natural law.8
In this way, natural law preserved the crucial  elements of the Greek
physis.  It  was  real,  and  it  was  normative.  Thereafter,  aside  from
Christian theology, although  the tradition  of natural  law continued, it
lost that duality, which the intellectual separation of "is"  and "ought"
made  impossible  outside  of religion.  In  the  guise  of  a  doctrine  of
natural rights  as, still later, in jurisprudence,  natural law became  one
kind of moral  theory, the distinctive  quality of which was  that it was
said  to  be  true,  even  self-evidently  true.  Reality,  or  nature,  and
especially the  interconnectedness  of the right and the real was not in
the  case,  except  as  an  expression  of  what  one  took  to  be
incontrovertibly true.9  Puzzlement  about humankind's place in nature
was  refashioned  as  a  question  of  the  relationship  between  the
individual  and  the  state,  to  which  natural  law  in  various  guises,
adapted to fit the theory at hand, provided an answer.  It is instructive
to  look  at  the  great  political  philosophers  of  the  seventeenth  and
eighteenth centuries-Hobbes,  Locke,  and Rousseau-in  that light.1"
In jurisprudence, the legal positivists accused the natural law theorists
of confusing "is"  and "ought,"  because they conflated questions about
what the law is with questions about what the law ought to be, and, so
the  positivists  said,  asserted  that  a  very bad  law  was  not law  at  all.
5.  Weinreb, NL&J, supra note 1, at 15-35.
6.  Id. at 43-66.
7.  Id. at 39-42.
8.  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 91,  art. 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947)  (n.p., n.d.).
9.  See Weinreb, NL&J, supra  note 1, at 108-15.
10.  Id. at 62-96.
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Natural  law  theorists  responded  that  the  legal  positivists  made
questions about one's obligation to obey law trivial.  And in truth, for
all  the  anguish  that  lay  behind  it,  the  whole  debate  seemed  trivial.
Because  the  case  for natural law  did not go  beyond  the assertion  of
moral certitude, it appeared that the debate had to do not with what is
the case but merely with what label to apply.1
To  the  modern mind,  the  original  conception  of natural  law,  the
idea  of physis,  a  normative  natural  order,  is  simply  a fundamental
mistake.  The  separation  of  "is"  and  "ought,"  description  and
prescription, is not a theory or position; it is a given, where we start.  It
can, however,  be demonstrated,  I believe,  that the idea  of justice,  as
we understand  and use it, contains an incoherence-the  antinomy  of
freedom and cause at the individual level, and the antinomy of liberty
and  equality  at  the  level  of  community-that  only  a  conception  of
normative  natural  order  resolves.  Far  from  supplanting  the  Greek
view, we have merely hidden the problem out of sight and agreed not
to talk about it.  And so the question is whether, without requiring too
great  a  suspension  of disbelief,  there  is  any  aspect  of  the  real  that
contains an indisputable normative element.
I  believe  that  there  is.  Oddly,  the  natural  rights  theorists  had  it
right.  But  because  their interests, both  intellectually  and practically,
were not  ontological  but  political,  they did  not  recognize  what  they
had and came out in the wrong place.
The place where  nature and the moral  order intersect is the matter
of rights.  The division  between  persons and things  is  an inescapable
fact  about our experience  of the world.  The distinction does not rest
merely  on physical  or mental  differences,  although  departures  from
the  norm  in  those  respects  may  make  hard  cases.  Rather,  the
distinction  is  that  persons  are  responsible  and,  as  responsible,  have
rights; things are not responsible and have no rights.
We  are looking for  a  place  in the  description  of the  world as  it  is
that in  and of itself implicates normative  conclusions;  that is,  we  are
looking for a locus of the normative in nature.  The only phenomenon
that meets  that description-as opposed  to the view that nothing can
meet it-is  persons, regarded  as bearers  of rights.  That  rights have
normative  implications  or,  if  you  like,  are  normative  concepts,  is
evident.  Perhaps it is the case-pace  Immanuel Kant-that rights can
be  overridden;  but  they  unquestionably  have  a  bearing,  a  strong
bearing, on how one ought to behave.  More controversial is the other
side of the matter:  that who has rights and what rights they have is a
matter of fact.
For  a  start, the  grammar  of rights  is instructive.  We speak  about
many  rights,  many  sorts of rights,  in  a normative  mode.  "Everyone
ought  to  have  a  right  to  medical  coverage."  "Some  groups  in  the
11.  Id. at 97-101,  259-63.
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population  ought to have  a  right to preference  for municipal jobs  or
college admissions"-or  "No  one ought to have  such  a right."  "Gay
persons ought to have a right to marry."  The grammar changes when
we  reach  the  level  of  "natural  rights"  or  "human  rights."  It  is  no
longer appropriate  to  use the  normative  mode.  "Everyone  ought to
have a natural right to food and shelter."  "There ought to be a human
right to reasonable employment."  "Gay adults ought-or ought not-
to have a natural right to engage in consensual sex."  We do not speak
that way (unless  our words are surrounded  with quotation marks)  for
good reason.  Either there  is such  a right or there  is not.  Of course,
the  right  may  or  may  not  be  honored.  And  one  can  say  that  this
country  or that  ought  to honor the  human  right  to  food  and shelter
better  than  it does, or that  it  ought to  recognize  the human  right to
work,  or  that  the  Universal  Declaration  of Human  Rights  ought  to
include  reference  to  some  particular  right.  But  to  whom,  to  what,
could a claim simply that something ought to be a natural right, which
is to say, a human right, properly be addressed?  Such a claim amounts
to  an assertion  that the natural  order ought to be different.  Natural
rights, or  human rights, are asserted  as  a matter of fact, to which  the
proper  response  is not,  "I think-don't think-that  would be  a good
idea," or "I agree" or "I don't agree," but simply "True"  or "False." 2
The facticity of rights has always  been the great stumbling block to
an analysis of rights.  Judith Thomson made  rights the  focus of years
of  fruitful  scholarship,  but  in  the  end  she  says  that  rights  are
unanalyzable.  They  are  simply  "moral  facts."  Putting  aside  the
objection that there are not supposed to be any moral facts, what  are
they?  Thomson seems generally to disregard  the implications  of the
very phrase she uses.13
The  short response  is:  there are  no  moral facts,  and  there  are  no
natural, or human, rights.  To say that a right is "natural"  or "human"
is to  say  only  that  one  thinks  it is  a  very  important  right,  one that
ought  to  be  recognized  for  all  persons.  Although  the  statement,
"There ought to be a natural right to food and shelter" is meaningless,
the statement that every nation ought to recognize a right to food and
shelter for all its people is not.  And, speaking carefully, that is all that
the  former  statement  means.  It  is  a rhetorical  flourish  and  nothing
more.  So, rights are only normative after all.
That  method  of  avoidance  does  not  work,  because  we  need  a
concept  of  rights  in  its  strong  form  to  account  for  the  difference
between  persons and things.  That difference  is a structural fact of our
experience.  And  the  core  of  the  difference  is  the  notion  of
responsibility,  the  difference  between  being  the  cause  of  some
occurrence  and  being,  in  the  full  sense  that  implicates  moral
12.  Weinreb, OAFP, supra  note 1, at 13-21.
13.  See id. at 37-39.
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judgment, responsible  for it.  By "structural fact"  I mean a proposition
that  cannot  be  contradicted  without  altering  the  nature  of  our
experience,  not just in  some concrete  particulars but fundamentally,
making it a different  experience  altogether.  To deny that persons are
responsible (or, for that matter, to assert that things are responsible)  is
not like denying  that human  beings have  opposable digits or denying
that any human beings live on Staten Island.  Those  propositions are
startling  enough,  but we  would  adjust,  if  only by  supposing  that  the
denial  was  play-acting.  Strict  behaviorists  may  deny  that  human
beings  are  responsible  in  this  sense,  but  they  do  not behave  as  if it
were  so.  If  they  did,  we  should  lock  them  up.  To  deny  the
responsibility  of persons  does  not  merely  contradict  something  that
we believe strongly to be true.  It transforms the nature of what we, as
human beings, experience.  To translate a description of behavior that
we  think  responsible  into  a  description entirely  in terms  of causes  is
not  equivalent,  because  responsibility  has  no  equivalent  in  those
terms.  14
Speaking  about  responsibility  as  the  difference  between  persons
and  things,  I  referred  to  human  beings,  because  broadly  speaking,
leaving aside troubling  cases at the edges-infants, the very aged, the
comatose-all  human  beings  are  persons,  that  is,  are  responsible
beings.  Again,  leaving  aside  some  possibly  troubling  cases-the
Planet of the Apes-only human beings,  defined simply by  birth to a
human mother, are persons.  Those propositions would  be tested if a
creature  from another planet altogether unlike us physically exhibited
a sense of human  responsibility.  Would  we  regard  the  creature  as a
person?  (To  suggest  the  profound  implications  of  the  question,
consider  how an affirmative  answer would affect the story of Genesis.
Or consider how the story of Genesis indicates an answer.)"
There are many puzzles about responsibility.  Hardest  of all  are not
the  cases  of unusual  individual  beings  or  beings  in  stages of  the  life
cycle  in which responsibility  is generally  lacking.  The latter cases  are
generally  resolved  by  regarding  birth  to  a  human  mother  as
establishing  a  conclusive  presumption  of  personhood,  even  if
responsibility  is  temporarily  or  permanently  lacking.  The
presumption  is  accepted  the  more  easily  because  persons  who  are
indubitably responsible  pass regularly  through periods  when  they are
not, like sleep.  Rather, the hardest puzzle is the ordinary ascription of
responsibility  in the standard case of an adult, competent person.  We
take it for granted that one is responsible  in a moral sense,  the sense
that implies desert, only for conduct that is self-determined.  Just as a
hurricane  is  not  responsible  in  that  sense for  the  devastation  that it
causes,  and  a puppy  is not  responsible  for the  mess it  leaves  on the
14.  Id. at 45-46.
15.  See id. at 101-13.
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floor,  a  person  is  not  responsible  in  that  sense  for  bumping  into
someone if he is shoved from behind, for crying  out if he is stuck with
a pin, or for any of the conduct about which he might  say, "I couldn't
help  it."  Usually  that  is  an  empirical  question,  although  there  is
plenty  of  ambiguity,  plenty  of  difficult,  close  cases,  and  plenty  of
disagreement.  But  generally  there  is  a  pattern,  understood  and
accepted by us all.16
The  pattern  is  illustrated  by  our  practice  of  excuses.  Self-
determination is not a quality of action that we observe, like speed or
agility.  We speak of someone acting with determination, not of acting
with self-determination.  But in a general way,  even if conduct  is  of a
kind for which we ordinarily regard  persons as  responsible, we regard
as  not  self-determined  conduct  that  has  a  recognized,  identifiable
causal  explanation  that places  the  person outside  the  endless  variety
of  the  ordinary.  Not  regarded  as  excuses  are  any  of  the  ordinary
qualities  of one's  nature-intelligence,  good  looks,  physical  strength,
or  their  lack-or  any  of  the  ordinary  qualities  of nurture-loving,
supporting,  economically successful  parents, or their lack.  Some rise
above  their individual circumstances,  and some fall below  theirs.  But
we suppose that attributes  such  as industriousness  and  determination
(not self-determination)  are also a product  of nurture  and, more  and
more it turns out, nature-the chemical composition  of the  body,  the
shape and mass of the brain-both beyond our control.
In  fact,  the  determinist  argues  that  everything  we  are  now  is
traceable  to who, what, we were,  in  an unbroken chain of cause  and
effect, circumstance  and consequence.  That is true as a matter of fact,
since whatever  else we may be, we  are part of the natural order.  And
it is true as a matter of principle.  For if an action that a person takes
now  is  not,  however  indirectly,  a  determinate  consequence  of  the
person's individual  attributes that are  themselves  fully determined  in
the  same  way,  how  is  it  anything  more  than  happenstance,  not  his
normatively,  in  a way that makes him responsible, but only an event
that happened to him, in which he happened  to be embroiled, much as
Oedipus  was  unwillingly  and  unwittingly  embroiled  in the  destiny  of
the  Theban  royal  house  and,  despite  himself,  fulfilled  the  oracle's
prophecy  that  he  would  kill  his  father  and  commit  incest  with  his
mother. 7
The  notion  of human responsibility  requires  that our  acts  be free,
that is  to say  self-determined  and not determinate.  But, at the same
time,  unless an  act is  fully determined  by  the person  as he  is and not
by  anything  else,  it  is  not  his  in  the  necessary  sense.  It  is  a  true
antinomy,  not  resolvable  by  halves,  some  of  one  and  some  of  the
16.  See id. at 40-65.
17.  See id. at 46-51.
20041 2293FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
other.  The  autonomy  on  which  responsibility  and  desert  depend
requires that actions be fully undetermined and fully determined.
The scope of the antinomy is indicated by our extraordinary, not to
say desperate, solutions.  For the ancient Greeks, the solution was that
Oedipus was responsible  for the circumstances of his being, that to be
Oedipus, the person that he was, was to do as he  did.  Responsibility
attaches to his self, because the natural order is itself normative.  We,
of course, reject that solution out of hand.  We are not responsible for
what  we  cannot help.  Some years  ago, an official  in the Department
of Education, evidently a student of classical Greece,  asserted publicly
that a person should be held responsible for physical handicaps  due to
birth defects,  which the  official said reflected  a person's inner worth.
The  official was excoriated  in the  press and finally  resigned from her
government  position. 18   Kant's  solution  was  to  remove  the
autonomous self to an ineffable, noumenal plain, from which all traces
of the  phenomenal,  causally  determinate  self  are  removed.  But,  of
course, we  are interested  in the  actions of the responsible  self within
the phenomenal  universe.  The person whom we reward  and punish is
the  phenomenal  self,  with  all  those  actual  attributes.  Kant's
argument,  as  he  acknowledged,  is  not  a  solution  but  a  thorough,
rigorous statement of the problem.  Or the currently favored approach
of  Strawson  and  others:  There  simply  are  two  perspectives,  the
scientific  and  the moral.  There  is  no unified  perspective,  nor  need
there be.  All that is required is to specify the point of view.  But it is
not so, again because the person to whom we respond one way or the
other  is  one  and  the  same  person,  acting  freely  or not,  with  all  his
characteristics, his self. 19
Abstracted  from  reference  to  an  individual  person,  the  puzzle  of
human responsibility is lodged within the notion of justice.  Hence, the
title  of my book,  Oedipus at Fenway Park. If Oedipus's fate was,  as
we think, unjust, why is it just that Roger Clemens gets to play for the
Red  Sox  (as  it  then  was)  rather  than  some  young  man  who
desperately wants to play in the major leagues but has a bad pitching
arm, never makes a base  hit, and bobbles  the ball in the field-all of
which  he tries ceaselessly  to overcome.  Our response  is peremptory:
Clemens just is a better ball player.  He is Roger  Clemens, and being
Roger  Clemens,  the  person  that  he  is,  he  deserves  to  play  for  the
team.  But isn't that like the Greek answer to the fate of Oedipus-he
is Oedipus-an  answer that we  reject out of hand?  Nor can the  two
cases  be  distinguished  because  baseball  is  only  a  game.  Try  telling
18.  See  Philip Shenon,  Weicker and Education Chief in Sharp Clash, N.Y.  Times,
Apr.  17,  1985,  at  B4;  The Philosopher  and the Handicapped,  N.Y.  Times,  Apr.  18,
1985,  at  A26; Stephen  Engleberg,  Two Aides Quit Education Dept. in Dispute Over
Views  on Disabled, N.Y.  Times,  Apr.  19,  1985,  at  A19;  Handicapping Education,
Newsweek, Apr. 29, 1985, at 33.
19.  See Weinreb, OAFP, supra note 1, at 51-55.
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that to the young man-or, one might add,  to all those  Red Sox fans
who waited out those extra innings last October.  But, in any case, just
the  same  argument  might  be  made  across  the  river,  where  the
question  is  not  who  plays  for  the  Red  Sox but  who  is  admitted  to
Harvard.  That, we  all agree, is  not a game, or not only a game.z°  In
this  way,  the  antinomy  of  freedom  and  cause  is  reflected  in  the
antinomy  of  desert  and  entitlement.  The  former  reflects  the
individual,  autonomous  actor,  responsible  and  incurring  desert.
Entitlement  reflects  the  just  background  order  that  alone  gives
meaning  to individual  responsibility  and  desert.  And  rights  are  the
means by which we make the distinction.1
To say that a person has a right to  do, or to be, something  is to say
that he is responsible for what he does or is.  Nothing more.  That, and
only  that,  is  the  source  and  explanation  of  the  facticity  of rights.
Having  a right to do  something  does not mean  that one will  do  it or
ought to do it.  More  often  than not, the  assertion of a right suggests
that perhaps one ought not act in that way.  A right to do something is
also, necessarily, a right not to do it; for if one did not have a right not
to do it, there would be no point in saying that one has a right to do it.
Rights  constitute  our  autonomous  selves.  Having  a  right,  one  is
responsible for its exercise  (or nonexercise).  Not having a right, one is
subject to the causal order of nature or, as we usually think of it, to a
humanly imposed constraint; one is not responsible and does not incur
desert.  The  normative  natural  order  is  the  order  in  which  we,  as
natural beings, are also bearers of rights and exercise responsibility.2
That  is a lot to swallow.  Let me elaborate and add some footnotes.
I am  speaking  of rights  as attributes  of a person  simply  as  a  person,
not as American  or British, professor or student, member  of this club
or that.  That is, since all human beings are persons and all persons are
human beings,  I am speaking of human  or, as they used to be  called,
natural  rights.  In  any  more  particular  role,  as  an  American  or
professor  or club member, a person may be  granted additional rights,
or  not  granted  additional  rights  that  others  are  granted,  for
instrumental  reasons.  If additional rights are granted, then within the
bounds  of and  according  to the  terms  of the  community  that grants
them, a person is responsible  for what he does.  To say that one has a
right  is not necessarily  to say that the right  is honored, and if it is not,
within  that  community  a  person  is  not  responsible  for  the
consequence  in question.  To say that a person does not have a right is
not necessarily  to say that he  lacks the  power;  and if he exercises  the
power,  he  will be subject  to blame  for acting without  right.  But if a
person  does exercise  the power,  albeit without right, it demonstrates
that he  has the right  to liberty that enables him  to do so.  So  a thief,
20.  Id. at 66-73.
21.  See Weinreb, NL&J, supra note 1, at 184-223.
22.  Weinreb, OAFP, supra note 1, at 74-100.
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who  has  no  right  to  steal  a  wallet,  is  responsible  for  doing  so,  and
subject to punishment, is able to do so only because he has the right-
the right  to liberty-to  determine  his conduct.  It would  be another
matter entirely if he  lacked  that right.  Then we  should put  him in a
cage-or prison-and prevent him directly from stealing a wallet.
Because we  tend to think of rights  as things that can be granted or
withheld,  honored  or ignored,  it  is  easy  to  think  of them  not  as  a
matter of fact but as  something that one ought, or ought not, to have.
But it is just that facticity of rights-moral facts-that gives us  all the
difficulty.  In just  the  same  way,  responsibility  is  a  matter  of  fact
(although it may be a much contested  matter of fact).  A person is or
is  not  responsible  for  this  or  that.  It  makes  no  sense  to say  that a
person ought to be responsible.  That is like saying a chipmunk ought
to be responsible.  To whom could such a statement be addressed?  Of
course,  a person may behave  responsibly  or not, and if the  latter, he
may  incur  blame.  But  a  person  incurs no  blame  if  he  is  not  in fact
responsible for the conduct in question.
For  human  beings,  therefore,  apart  from  nature  and  a  part  of  it,
rights specify the boundary between constitutive  attributes, those that
define  us  individually  as  autonomous,  responsible  beings,  and
circumstantial  attributes,  those  that  happen  to  us,  with  respect  to
which  we  are natural  beings, within  a  chain of  cause  and effect.  So
long as we refer to a person's attributes descriptively, there is no need
to distinguish  constitutive and circumstantial attributes.  But when we
refer  to  a  person  normatively,  as  an  autonomous  being,  acting
responsibly  and  incurring  desert,  there  is  a  need  to  make  that
distinction, because he is not responsible for, and incurs no desert for,
circumstances  that  happen  to  him,  not  by  him.  Circumstantial
attributes  are  subject  to  amelioration  or  limitation  for  instrumental
reasons,  reasons  of social  policy,  because  they  are  not deserved  but
merely circumstantial.  Constitutive attributes, on the other hand, are
deserved  and constitute  a  person as  he  is normatively, and  they may
not  justly  be  limited  or,  without  unjustly  depriving  some  other,
ameliorated.23
Consider  affirmative  action.  Are  the  educational  handicaps  of
many  African-Americans  in  this  country-lack  of  family  models,
parents  who  are  not  alumni  of  prestigious  institutions,  bad
schooling-constitutive  or  circumstantial?  If  they  are  constitutive,
simply who that person  is, like  Roger Clemens's good right arm, then
they  are  deserved,  and  there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  be
ameliorated  by affirmative  action.  But if they are circumstantial,  the
effects of circumstances without  normative significance,  then they are
undeserved  and  ought  to  be  ameliorated,  in  order  to  satisfy  the
demands  of justice.  Amelioration,  of  course,  is  not  cost-free.  It
23.  Id. at 87-100.
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requires  the  limitation  of  someone  else's  opportunities  to  use  his
favorable  attributes  to his advantage,  and, unless  those attributes are
not  constitutive,  the limitation  will  be  unjust.24  The  same  could  be
asked of other attributes, such as a high IQ or low IQ, with respect to
anyone.  We can always ameliorate or the reverse, if not directly, then
by the example of the Wizard  of Oz.  If we cannot give the Scarecrow
a  brain,  we  can  give  him  a  college  degree.  If  we  cannot  give  the
Cowardly  Lion courage,  we  can  give  him a  medal  and a  seat on  the
dais, which is probably all he wanted  anyway.  And if we cannot take
away  the powers  of the  Wicked  Witch  of the  West, we  can  tax  her
profits.  So  long  as  a  person  has  her  rights,  and  only  her  rights,
responsibility  makes sense  and the demands  of justice  are  met.  If a
person has more or less than what she has a right to, justice is denied.
But  isn't  this  manner  of  speaking-the  constituted  self  and  its
attributes,  and  the  circumstantial  self  and  its  attributes-willfully
confusing?  There is, after  all, only one person with all her attributes.
Yes.  So  long  as the  matter  at  hand  is  not  a  matter of the  person's
desert-or responsibility.  If that is our concern,  then attention to the
distinction  is  unavoidable,  because  desert  depends  on responsibility,
and  responsibility  depends  on  the  freedom  that  is  the  antinomy  of
cause; that is to say, it depends on rights.  The unity of our being is not
a part  of the  puzzle;  rather,  it is  an  essential  aspect  of  the  solution.
Responsible  conduct  is  self-determined,  that is  both  not  determined
and  fully  determined  according  to  one's  self.  That  is  the  human
condition,  and  only the  human  condition.  Things,  animals,  are  not
persons,  they  are  not  responsible,  and  they  do  not  have  rights.  So
also, angels, whose nature it is always to will the good, have no rights.
They have no need  of them.  Responsibility, for angels,  is out of the
question.
What  rights,  then,  does  a  person  have?  Proceeding  from  the
premise  that  all  and  only  human  beings  are  persons,  what  human
rights  are  there,  rights  that  all  humans,  merely  as  humans,  have?
Rights  are  an  implication  of  autonomy,  or  personhood,  so  we  start
from there.  I should say that the human rights are these:
1.  The  right  not  to  be  subjected  to  constraints  too  great  to  be
resisted.  Since human beings are, as a matter of fact, persons, they
must have  a domain of autonomous action that is not restricted by
the power of others.
2.  The  right  to  physical  and  mental  well-being.  Perhaps  it  is
always  possible  to  try.  But  one  must  have  some  capacity,  some
possibility  of effective  action,  to believe  that  it  is  worthwhile  to
try.  So  there  is  a  right  to well-being.  The  satisfaction  of  basic
human needs-food and shelter-is an aspect of this right.
3.  The right to education.  Effective agency, autonomous action, is
24.  See id. at 181-95.
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a  matter of intellect as  well as will.  One must  have a  capacity to
reflect congruent with one's situation.
4.  The  right  to  moral  consciousness.  One  must  be  aware  of
oneself as not merely a source of power, like an electrical  storm or
a wild beast, but as a moral actor.  One has a right to development
as a moral being.
5.  The right to moral opportunities.  One must not have all one's
choices made for one,  even if they are made in one's favor.  One
must  not  be  so  educated  or  trained,  like  Rousseau's  citizen  or
Winston  in  Nineteen Eighty-Four 25  that  he  always  chooses  the
good, or what passes for the good.  Angels are not persons.  There
is a human right not to dwell in paradise.26
Other human  rights are  sometimes  mentioned.  The  right to  what
one  has.  The  right  to  equal  dignity  and  respect.  The  right  to  life.
Each of these asserted rights refers to some value that may be thought
to  be  of  great,  even  overriding,  importance.  I  do  not  want  to
contradict that.  I should say, however, without elaborating  the point
here,  that  none  of  those  rights  is  an  indisputable  condition  of
responsibility.  For that reason, I qualify them not as rights but rather
as basic components of the good.27
The  human  rights  that  I  have  identified  are  glaringly  imprecise.
And,  inasmuch  as  they  belong  to  all  human  beings,  they  do  not
differentiate  among  individuals.  Yet  responsibility  is  insistently
individual.  How  do  we  justify  concretely  differential  individual
attributes?  The  former  issue-the  rights  common  to  all-are
important, desperately  so, in a world where so often rights are denied
for so many.  But we  need also to understand the basis for differential
rights, not the rights  that we  all  have  in common, but  the rights  that
each  of  us  as  an  individual  has,  which  differentiate  us  normatively.
We  do  not  start  from  an  abstract  principle.  Autonomy  is  not  a
derivation of reason (even for Kant, whose moral theory sought not to
derive  autonomy from reason  but rationally to derive  the conditions
of  autonomy,  taken  as  a  given).  We  start  from  the  concrete
experience  of persons  as persons,  and consequently  the  direction  of
thought is from concrete particulars to the abstract  and general.  The
source  of individual  rights  that  differentiate  us  one  from  another  is
found  in  experience.  One  must  look  to  the  deep  normative
conventions  of the community for the bounds of personhood,  what is
constitutive and what circumstantial.  That is not to say that whatever
is, is right.  Rather I mean what the Ancient Greeks  meant by nomos,
the  constantly  reconsidered,  deepest,  weightiest  aspects  of  a
community's  way  of life,  what  we  commonly  refer  to as  civil rights.
25.  George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Penguin Group 2003)  (1949).
26.  Weinreb, OAFP, supra note  1, at 114-22.
27.  Id. at 122-36.
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Not only  the contested, potentially  vulnerable  rights we  usually refer
to as civil rights-the  right  to vote, the  rights specified  in  the Bill  of
Rights-but  also,  and  more  important,  the  deepest  understanding
about  the  contradictory  values  of  liberty  and  equality  that  define  a
community:  What  an individual  can withhold from, or demand from,
the  community,  and  what  the  community  can  demand  from,  or
withhold  from,  an  individual.  The  rights  that  define  a  person  are
always in some state of flux.  They conjoin what is and what ought to
be.  In that way,  the abstract conjunction  of is  and ought  is brought
concretely down to earth. 28
Issues  about  affirmative  action  are  so  difficult  because  the
community's way of life is deeply conflicted.  The intractable question
is how  to regard the  differential  attributes of African-Americans  and
others  who  have  been  and  are  deprived  as  not  deserved,  not
constitutive,  and,  therefore,  appropriate  for  amelioration,  without
regarding the differential attributes of others who have fared better as
similarly  not  constitutive  and,  therefore,  appropriate  for  limitation.
Both sides perceive  the issue, correctly, as a matter of justice, because
their individual worth, or desert, is at stake, according to the nomos of
the  community.29  So  also,  to answer  the question  whether  a  person
who  is  gay  has distinct rights  associated with  sexual orientation,  one
must look to the actual practices of the community.  In 1994, when my
book  Oedipus at Fenway Park was  published,  I  concluded  that  the
nomos of this community, reflected in open acknowledgement  of gay
sexuality  by  public  figures,  participation  of  openly  gay  persons  in
every  kind  of  public  event,  frank  portrayal  of gay  sexuality  in  the
theatre,  movies,  fiction,  and  so  forth, indicated  a  right  to one's  own
sexual  identity,  whether  deliberately  chosen  or not.3"  The  Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v.  Texas3  confirmed that.  But that is not
so in every country and, even in the United States, such a conclusion is
as tenuous as the public attitudes on which it rests.
So, to return to the beginning, can what I have  outlined properly be
regarded as a theory of natural law?  The answer, I think, is yes.  It is a
theory that  locates  the  normative  aspect  of our existence  within  the
natural  order,  in  the  irrefutable  designation  of  human  beings  as
persons.  And is it worth our attention?  Again, the answer is yes.  The
theory  does  not  itself provide  us  with  a  moral  calculus,  nor  even  a
moral  compass.  It requires  us to look toward  and beyond the  actual
conditions  of the community  in which  we  live.  But  it is not  without
significance.  Its  largest  significance  is  that  it  rejects  a  utilitarian
calculation  of  the  good  as  sufficient  in  itself.  It  insists  that  the
recognition  of persons  as  persons,  honoring  their  rights,  is  the  only
28.  Id. at 137-56.
29.  Id. at 181-95.
30.  Id. at 171-78.
31.  123 S.  Ct.  2472 (2003).
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path to the good, not the highest good perhaps, but the humanly good.
And  it  tells  us,  without  providing  a  certain  guide  to  success,  the
manner and means for achieving it.